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Abstract
Background: The global spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic has
clearly shown the importance of considering the long-range transportation networks in the
understanding of emerging diseases outbreaks. The introduction of extensive transportation data
sets is therefore an important step in order to develop epidemic models endowed with realism.
Methods: We develop a general stochastic meta-population model that incorporates actual travel
and census data among 3 100 urban areas in 220 countries. The model allows probabilistic
predictions on the likelihood of country outbreaks and their magnitude. The level of predictability
offered by the model can be quantitatively analyzed and related to the appearance of robust
epidemic pathways that represent the most probable routes for the spread of the disease.
Results: In order to assess the predictive power of the model, the case study of the global spread
of SARS is considered. The disease parameter values and initial conditions used in the model are
evaluated from empirical data for Hong Kong. The outbreak likelihood for specific countries is
evaluated along with the emerging epidemic pathways. Simulation results are in agreement with the
empirical data of the SARS worldwide epidemic.
Conclusion: The presented computational approach shows that the integration of long-range
mobility and demographic data provides epidemic models with a predictive power that can be
consistently tested and theoretically motivated. This computational strategy can be therefore
considered as a general tool in the analysis and forecast of the global spreading of emerging diseases
and in the definition of containment policies aimed at reducing the effects of potentially catastrophic
outbreaks.
Background
The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
in 2002–2003 represented a serious public health threat
to the international community. Its rapid spread to
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regions far away from the initial outbreak created great
concern for the potential ability of the virus to affect a
large number of countries and required a coordinated
effort aimed at its containment [1]. Most importantly, it
clearly pointed out that people's mobility and traveling
along commercial airline routes is the major channel for
emerging disease propagation at the global scale. Spatio-
temporal structures of human movements thus need to be
considered for a global analysis of epidemic outbreaks [2],
as for example in [3], which incorporates the airline net-
work structure of the largest 500 airports of the world.
In this article, we present a stochastic meta-population
epidemic model, based on the extension of the determin-
istic modeling approach to global epidemic diffusion
[4,5], for the study of the worldwide spread of emerging
diseases that includes the complete International Air
Transport Association (IATA) commercial airline traffic
database associated with urban areas census information
[6,7]. Once the disease parameters are determined, no free
adjustable parameters are left in the model. A toolkit of
specific indicators that consider the stochastic nature of
the process is introduced to provide risk analysis scenarios
and to assess the reliability of epidemic forecasts. In par-
ticular, the predictive power of the model is linked to the
emergence of epidemic propagation pathways related to
the complex properties of the transportation network. The
SARS epidemic is used as a case study to assess the model
effectiveness and accuracy against real data. The model
considers disease parameters estimated from the Hong
Kong outbreak in a way consistent with the global nature
of the meta-population model by including the impact of
infectious individuals traveling in and out of the city. The
temporal and geographic pattern of the disease is ana-
lyzed, and the proposed toolkit of epidemic indicators is
tested against empirical data.
Methods
We adopt a global stochastic meta-population model that
considers a set of coupled epidemic transmission models.
The approach is in the same spirit as the deterministic
models used for the global spread of infectious diseases
and their successive stochastic generalizations [3,6,7],
where each compartmental model represents the evolu-
tion of the epidemic within one urban area, and the mod-
els are coupled by air travel. The air travel data from the
IATA [8] database is included in the model and deter-
mines the traveling probabilities. It includes the 3 100
largest commercial airports around the globe and 17 182
connections among them, accounting for more than 99%
of the total worldwide traffic. Each airport is surrounded
by the corresponding urban area whose population is
assumed to be homogeneously mixed for the disease
dynamics. Population data is collected from several cen-
sus databases (see [6,7] for more specific details). The
model is fully stochastic and takes into account the dis-
crete nature of individuals both in the travel coupling and
in the compartment transitions. The transmission model
within each urban area follows a compartmentalization
specific to the disease under study. For instance, in the
case of a simple Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR)
model, the population Nj of a city j is subdivided into sus-
ceptible, infectious and recovered individuals, so that Nj =
Sj(t) + Ij(t) + Rj(t) where Sj(t), Ij(t) and Rj(t) represent the
number of individuals in the corresponding compart-
ments at time t. In order to consider the discrete nature of
the individuals in the stochastic evolution of the infection
dynamics, we describe the disease propagation inside
each urban area by introducing binomial and multino-
mial processes. Two kinds of processes are considered in
the infection dynamics: the contagion process (e.g. the
generation of new infectious through the transmission of
the disease from infectious individuals to susceptibles)
and the transition of individuals from one compartment
to another (i.e. from infectious to recovered). In the first
class of processes it is assumed that each susceptible in city
j will be infected by the contact with an infectious individ-
ual with rate βIj(t)/Nj, where β is the transmission rate of
the disease. The number of new infections generated in
city j is extracted from a binomial distribution with prob-
ability βIj(t)Δt/Nj and number of trials Sj(t), where Δt is
the considered time scale interval. The second class
describes a transition process, where the number of indi-
viduals changing compartment: e.g. in the SIR model for
the city j: Ij → Rj with rate μ – is extracted from a binomial
distribution with a probability given by the rate of transi-
tion (in the previous example μ) and number of trials
given by the number of individuals in the compartment at
time t (in the previous example Ij(t)).
Changing from a basic SIR model to a refined compart-
mentalization, additional processes ought to be taken
into account, as the possibility of having more than one
compartment able to transmit the infection, due e.g. to
the non-perfect isolation of quarantined individuals. In
the case of SARS, which will be addressed in the following
section, the infection dynamics includes the specific char-
acteristics of the disease under study, such as latency, hos-
pitalization, patient isolation, and fatality rate [9-11].
Figure 1 illustrates a schematic representation of the com-
partmentalization adopted for the SARS case study,
whereas the details of the stochastic discrete evolution fol-
lowed by this specific compartmentalization are described
in Additional file 1.
Each compartmental model in a given urban area is then
coupled to the compartmental models of other urban
areas via a travel stochastic operator that identifies the
number of individuals in each compartment traveling
from the urban area i to the urban area j. The number ofBMC Medicine 2007, 5:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34
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passengers in the compartment X traveling from a city i to
a city j is an integer random variable, in that each of the Xi
potential travellers has a probability pij = wij/Ni to go from
i to j where wij is the traffic, according to the data, on a
given connection in the considered time scale and Ni is the
urban area population. In each city I, the numbers of pas-
sengers traveling on each connection at time t define a set
of stochastic variables that follows a multinomial distri-
bution. In addition, other routing constraints and two legs
travels can be considered. A detailed mathematical
description of the traveling coupling is reported in
[6,7,12].
The defined model considers stochastic fluctuations both
in the individual compartmental transitions and in the
traveling events. This implies that in principle each model
realization, even with the same initial conditions, may be
different from all the others. In this context, the compari-
son of a single realization of the model with the real evo-
lution of the disease may be very misleading. Similarly,
the mere comparison of the number of cases obtained in
each country averaged over several realizations with the
actual number of cases occurred is a poor indicator of the
reliability of the achieved prediction. Indeed in many
cases the average would include a large number of occur-
rences with no outbreaks in a variety of countries. It is
therefore crucial to distinguish in each country (or to a
higher degree of resolution, in each urban area) the non-
outbreak from the outbreak realizations and evaluate the
number of cases conditionally to the occurrence of the lat-
ter events. For this reason, we define in the following a set
of indicators and analysis tools that can be used to pro-
vide scenarios forecast and real world data comparison.
Outbreak likelihood and magnitude
The likelihood to experience an outbreak can be provided
by analyzing different stochastic occurrences of the epi-
demic with the same initial conditions, and by evaluating
the probability that the infection will reach a given coun-
try. In the following we will consider statistics over 103 dif-
ferent realizations of the stochastic noise, and define the
probability of outbreak in each country as the fraction of
realizations that produced a positive number of cases
within the country. This allows for the identification of
areas at risk of infection, with a corresponding quantita-
tive measure expressed by the outbreak probability. A
more quantitative analysis is obtained by inspecting the
predicted cumulative number of cases for each country,
conditional to the occurrence of an outbreak in the coun-
try. The outbreak likelihood and magnitude analysis can
be broken down at the level of single urban areas. In the
following section we present an example of the results
available at this resolution scale.
Predictability and epidemic pathways
The very high potential value of forecasting tools, in a
planning perspective against emerging infectious diseases,
points to the necessity of assessing the accuracy of such
epidemic forecasts with respect to the various stochastic
elements present in the process. Indeed, the present com-
putational approach provides meaningful predictions
only if all stochastic realizations of the epidemic, with the
same initial conditions and parameters, are somehow
similar in intensity, locations and time evolution. The air-
line network structure explicitly incorporated into the
model is composed by more than 17 000 different con-
Flow diagram of the transmission model Figure 1
Flow diagram of the transmission model. The population of 
each city is classified into seven different compartments, namely 
susceptible (S), latent (L), infectious (I), hospitalized who either 
recover (HR) or die (HD), dead (D) and recovered (R) individuals. 
We assume that hospitalized as well as infectious individuals are 
able to transmit the infection, given the large percentage of the 
cases among health care workers [37-39]. The actual efficiency of 
hospital isolation procedures is modeled through a reduction of 
the transmission rate β by a factor rβ for hospitalized patients, 
with rβ = 20% as estimated for the early stage of the epidemic in 
Hong Kong [9]. The infectiousness of patients in the compart-
ments HR and HD are assumed to be equal (although this assump-
tion can easily be changed in the model). Susceptible individuals 
exposed to SARS enter the latent class. Latents represent infected 
who are not yet contagious and are assumed to be asymptomatic, 
as suggested by results based on epidemiologic, clinical and diag-
nostic data in Canada [40]. They become infectious after an aver-
age time ε-1 (mean latency period). The individual is classified as 
infectious during an average time equal to μ-1 from the onset of 
clinical symptoms to his admission to the hospital where he even-
tually dies or recovers. Patients admitted to the hospital are not 
allowed to travel. The average periods spent in the hospital from 
admission to death or recovery are equal to μD
-1 and μR
-1, respec-
tively. The average death rate is denoted by d.
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nections among 3 100 cities. Such a large number of con-
nections produce a huge amount of possible different
paths available for the infection to spread throughout the
world. This in principle could easily result in a set of sim-
ulated epidemic outbreaks that are very different one from
the other – though starting from the same initial condi-
tions – thus leading to a poor predictive power for the
computational model. By contrast, while the airline net-
work topology tends to lower the predictability of the dis-
ease evolution, the heterogeneity of the passenger volume
on the various connections defines specific diffusion
channels on the high traffic routes. Ultimately, the degree
of predictability is determined by the competing effects of
connectivity and traffic heterogeneities [6,7] once the ini-
tial starting conditions and parameters of the disease are
fixed [13]. In order to measure quantitatively the stochas-
tic variability in the computational model of a specific dis-
ease we follow [6,7] and consider an overlap function
Θ(t), which describes the similarity of two different out-
break realizations starting from the same initial condi-
tions. The overlap function measures the similarity of two
different realizations of the epidemic outbreak by com-
paring the evolution in time of the number of active indi-
viduals  Aj(t) in each urban area j, defined as those
individuals carrying the infection. Each outbreak starting
from the same initial conditions is characterized by a vec-
tor   whose  j-th component represents the probability
that an active individual is in city j at time t, πj(t) = Aj(t)/
∑lAl. Following [6,7], we compute the statistical similarity
between two different realizations characterized by the
vectors   and  , respectively, by considering the
Hellinger affinity defined as  .
This normalized measure is invariant under a rescaling of
the vectors   and   by a constant factor. There-
fore, we introduce also the similarity between the world-
wide epidemic prevalence obtained in the two
realizations: ,  where 
and a(t) = ∑jAj/ℵ, with ℵ = ∑jNj being the world popula-
tion. The overlap function Θ(t) is thus defined as:
The overlap Θ(t) assumes values between 0 and 1, being
equal to 0 if at time t the two epidemic patterns do not
share any common infected city, and equal to 1 if at time
t the two realizations are identical. The more an outbreak
is predictable, the more likely the two realizations will be
similar, leading to a high value of the overlap function. In
view of the strong fluctuations inherent to the infection
process and the movement of individuals, the presence of
an appreciable overlap can be possible only in the pres-
ence of a robust mechanism driving the disease propaga-
tion and leading to the emergence of epidemic pathways,
i.e. preferential channels along which the epidemic will
more likely spread [6,7]. These pathways on their turn
may find their origin in the large heterogeneities encoun-
tered in the traffic volume – ranging from a few passengers
to 106 passengers per year – associated with the air travel
connections. In order to pinpoint the presence of epi-
demic pathways, starting from identical initial conditions,
one can simulate different outbreaks subject to different
realizations of the stochastic noise and obtain the time
evolution of the epidemic in each urban area as described
in the main text. During the simulations, one observes the
propagation of the virus from one country to the other by
means of the air travel and thus monitors the path fol-
lowed by the infection at the country level. At each out-
break realization, it is possible to identify for each country
Ci the country Cj origin of the infection and construct the
graph of virus propagation; namely, if a latent or an infec-
tious individuals travels from Cj to Ci and causes an out-
break in the country Ci – not yet infected – a directed link
from Cj to Ci is created with weight equal to 1. Once the
origin of infection for Ci has been identified, the following
multiple introductions in Ci are not considered as we are
only interested in the path followed by the disease in
infecting a geographical region not yet infected. After a
statistically significant number of realizations, a directed
weighted network is obtained in which the direction of a
link indicates the direction of the virus diffusion and the
weight represents the number of times this flow has been
observed out of n  realizations. For each country Ci we
renormalize to 1 the sum of the weights on all incoming
links, in order to define the probability of infection on
each flow. The network of epidemic pathways is then
pruned by deleting all directed links having an occurrence
probability less than a given threshold, in order to clearly
identify the major pathways along which the epidemic
will spread. This information identifies for each country
the possible origins of infection and provides a quantita-
tive estimation of the probability of receiving the infec-
tion from each identified origin. It is therefore
information of crucial importance for the development
and assessment of preparation plans of single countries.
Travel advisories or limitations and medical screenings at
the ports of entry – such as those put in place during SARS
epidemic – might well strongly benefit from the analysis
and identification of such epidemic pathways.
Results
As a concrete example of the previous modeling approach
we analyze the specific case study of the SARS epidemic.
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Several mathematical models have been developed since
the SARS coronavirus was identified (see [14] and refer-
ences therein). Many of these approaches focused on
localized communities, such as generic hospital popula-
tions [15], specific cities or small regions [9,10,16-27],
whereas few others considered the role of global travel
[3,28]. In particular, the estimates of key epidemiological
parameters are traditionally obtained from fitting local
models (i.e. on the scale of cities, regions) to empirical
data. Such approaches assume closed boundary condi-
tions for the region under consideration, neglecting possi-
ble movements of individuals in and out of the region. In
the following we use the global computational model
defined in the previous section to simulate synthetic SARS
outbreak on the worldwide scale and compare with the
empirical data from the real world occurrence. The com-
partmentalization and the disease parameter values con-
sidered in the model are chosen according to previous
studies [1,11,29]. It is worth stressing however that the
compartmentalization used (see Figure 1), while bor-
rowed from the most authoritative references on the SARS
outbreak, is suffering from the approximations due to the
lack of information on the social specific structure and
heterogeneity that might be crucial for a full understand-
ing of the disease. Parameters are kept constant through-
out the evolution of the disease, except for the
hospitalization rate μ-1 and for the scaling of the transmis-
sion rate β, which follow a three steps function as in [11]
and [9], respectively (Table 1). These steps correspond to
the implementation in Hong Kong of containment meas-
ures and advisories effectively reducing the transmission
rate [9,11]. It is reasonable to consider a certain reaction
time delay taking place in each country from the detection
of the first case to the implementation of the policies
aimed at reducing the transmission rate on a national
scale. In the following, we report the results for an inter-
vention delay of 1 week. The Additional file reports the
results for immediate reaction (no delay) and 2 weeks
delay.
Initial conditions are based on available evidence on the
early stages of the outbreak and assume as index patient
the first case detected out of mainland China, who arrived
in Hong Kong on 21 February 2003 [30]. Simulations are
seeded in Hong Kong T0 days after 21 February with the
index patient and L(t = 0) initial latent. This allows the
effective consideration of the observed super-spreading
events [31-34] and multiple transmission before the index
patient was hospitalized [9]. The complete time frame
under study is from T0 days after 21 February to 11 July
2003, date corresponding to the last daily update by the
World Health Organization (WHO) on the cumulative
number of reported probable cases of SARS [35].
The values of the transmission rate β, of the initial number
of latent individuals L(t = 0), and of the initial delay of T0
days are determined through a least square fit procedure
to optimize the agreement of the stochastic simulation
results with Hong Kong data. The advantage with respect
to previous approaches is that no closed boundaries are
imposed on Hong Kong, allowing for the mobility of indi-
viduals traveling in the city and for a decrease of the pool
of infectious individuals who leave the city by means of
air travel. The optimization gives the following baseline
values: β = 0.57 [0.56–0.59], L(t = 0) = 10 [8–11], T0 = 3
days, where the errors reported for β and L(t = 0) corre-
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Description Baseline value
T0 Initial offset from 21 February (days) 3*
β Rate of transmission 0.57*
L(t = 0) Number of initial latent individuals 10*
21 February + T0-20 March 1.00
sf(t) Scaling factor for the rate of transmission 21 March – 9 April 0.37
10 April – 11 July 0.06
rβ Relative infectiousness of patients at the hospital 0.2
ε-1 Average latency period (days) 4.6
21 February + T0-25 March 4.84
μ-1(t) Average period from onset of symptoms to admission (days) 25 March – 1 April 3.83
2 April – 11 July 3.67
μR
-1 Average period from admission to recovery (days) 23.5
μD
-1 Average period from admission to death (days) 35.9
d Case fatality rate 0.2
Baseline values for all epidemiological parameters and initial conditions. Parameters marked with an asterisk (*) are estimated by our model through 
the fitting procedure described in the main text. The three successive decreasing values for the μ-1model are the prompter, identification and 
subsequent isolation of infectious individuals [11]. A step function is also assumed for the scaling factor sf(t) of the transmission parameter β, with 
values taken from the estimates of the effective reproductive number Rt with respect to R0 during the early stage of SARS epidemic in Hong Kong 
[9]. This corresponds to the effective reduction of the reproductive number due to the application of control measures [9].BMC Medicine 2007, 5:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34
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spond to a relative variation of 10% in the least square
value from the minimum, once the offset is set to its opti-
mal value. The obtained value of the reproductive number
– R0 = 2.76 – is in agreement with previous estimates [9].
We also tested different initial conditions that do not
effectively incorporate super-spreading events with no
substantial changes in the results.
Outbreak likelihood
In Figure 2 we represent on a map the countries that are
more likely to be infected with a color code, ranging from
gray, signaling low outbreak probability, to red for a high
probability of experiencing an outbreak. It represents a
quantitative indication of the risk to which each country
would be exposed in presence of a SARS-like infectious
disease in which the same containment measures are
implemented. It therefore provides a starting point for the
development of appropriate intervention scenarios aimed
at reducing that risk. The map readily identifies geograph-
ical areas with an appreciable likelihood for an outbreak.
In particular, many countries of South-East Asia display a
large probability of outbreak, as could be expected from
their vicinity from the initial seed. The fact that Western
Europe and North America also suffer outbreaks in most
realizations illustrates the role of large air traffic in the
propagation events. Figure 3 maps the outbreak likeli-
hood at a higher resolution scale, i.e. at the level of urban
areas, showing the expected situation in Canada. It is
worth noting that despite the large number of airports in
the country, only very few areas display a significant prob-
ability of outbreak, the two largest values corresponding
to the actual outbreaks experienced in Toronto and Van-
couver.
To proceed further in the comparison with empirical data,
we group countries in two categories according to a risk
threshold in the outbreak occurrence probability. The no-
risk countries are those where the probability of outbreak
is lower than the risk threshold. In any other situation the
country is defined at risk. In the following we set a risk
threshold of 20%. Small variations of the risk threshold
do not alter substantially the obtained results. In particu-
lar we show in Additional file 1 the results for the case of
a 10%, and 30% risk threshold. The results do not differ
considerably from those reported for the 20% risk thresh-
old. Obviously, progressively larger values of the risk
threshold leads to less significant results, and a risk thresh-
old of 40–50% is not providing valuable information as
defining a not at risk a country with a 45% outbreak prob-
ability would be quite unreasonable. In Figure 4 we repre-
sent the comparison between data reported by WHO on
11 July and the results obtained from the numerical sim-
ulations for the same date and the 20% risk threshold. The
report for 11 July, cross-checked with the WHO final sum-
mary obtained after laboratory tests, was of 28 infected
Worldwide map representation of the outbreak likelihood as predicted by the stochastic model Figure 2
Worldwide map representation of the outbreak likelihood as predicted by the stochastic model. Countries are represented 
according to the color code, ranging from gray for low outbreak probability to red for high outbreak probability.
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countries, spread on different continents [35]. Figure 4
shows in red the agreement of our results with the empir-
ical data, with full color for countries that our simulations
declare at risk and are found to be infected according to
the WHO report (correct prediction of outbreak), and
striped pattern for countries that are not infected accord-
ing to official reports and which we classify as no-risk
countries. Countries that belong to a class that is not in
agreement with the data are represented in green. The map
shows a very good agreement of forecasts with official
updates: the simulations capture the worldwide spread of
SARS by recovering with high success rate countries that
either were infected or remained uninfected. Out of a total
number of 220 countries in the world, simulations are
able to predict correctly 23 of the 28 infected countries by
11 July. Five countries are not classified at risk in the sim-
ulations while they reported probable cases – Mongolia,
Sweden, Kuwait, Ireland, Romania – and 10 countries are
considered at risk while no official update ever reported
any case (Table 2). In other words, the model provides a
correct classification for 205 out of 220 countries. Addi-
tional analysis shows that the agreement of our forecasts
with empirical data extends over the whole duration of
SARS outbreak, with a maximal error of about 7% only
(wrong classification for 15 countries out of 220).
Outbreak magnitude
A more quantitative analysis is obtained by comparing the
predicted cumulative number of cases for each country,
conditional to the occurrence of an outbreak in the coun-
try, with the corresponding empirical data [35]. The fore-
casts on the cumulative number of cases are reported in
Figure 5 with a box plot representing median, quartiles
and 90% CI and compared to the empirical data (red sym-
bols). All countries listed in the last WHO report are
shown for analysis, regardless of their predicted probabil-
ity of outbreak. Even for the five countries not classified at
Table 2: Forecasted number of cases for the countries with an 
incorrect prediction of outbreak
Country Median 90% CI
Japan 83 23–228
United Arab Emirates 6 1–36
Bangladesh 6 1–42
Saudi Arabia 5 1–35
Netherlands 5 1–26
Cambodia 5 1–40
Bahrain 4 1–30
Austria 4 1–26
Denmark 3 1–15
Brunei 3 1–16
List of countries that were not infected according to WHO official 
reports but are predicted as at risk by numerical simulations. Median 
and 90% CI are reported; results correspond to 11 July 2003.
Map representation of the outbreak likelihood within Canada at the urban area resolution scale Figure 3
Map representation of the outbreak likelihood within Canada at the urban area resolution scale. Urban areas are repre-
sented according to the color code, ranging from gray for low outbreak probability to red for high outbreak probability. Airports within 
Canada are also shown.BMC Medicine 2007, 5:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34
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risk it is indeed possible to test simulations against empir-
ical data by considering the cumulative number of cases
conditional to the presence of an outbreak. Panel (A)
shows the countries for which the empirical data lie inside
the fluctuations associated with the model forecasts. For
22 countries, out of the 28 of the final report, the model
is able to provide results where the actual number of cases
falls within the error bars of the statistical predictions. The
best agreement is obtained for Hong Kong, as expected, as
the initial conditions were fitted to Hong Kong data. It is
worth to note that all five countries wrongly predicted as
no-risk show statistics conditional to the outbreak in
agreement with empirical data (see inset of panel (A)).
Panels (B) and (C) correspond to the predictions for
which the observed data lie outside the range of fluctua-
tions of the model. Five countries fall in this category, two
of which – Thailand and Republic of Korea – report fluc-
tuations very close to the empirical data. While at first
sight the error bars associated to the model predictions
might appear large and the results of panels (B) and (C)
of Figure 5 for large outbreaks quite far from the real
occurrence, it is worth stressing that the predicted num-
bers of cases are strikingly in the correct ballpark if we con-
sider that we are dealing with a few hundred cases over the
total country population, typically of the order of several
millions. Finally, Table 2 reports data for the 10 countries
predicted at risk by simulations but where no infection
from SARS was reported. Japan represents an outlier: a
large number of cases is predicted by the numerical simu-
lations (the median being 83). Remarkably however, the
predicted number of cases remains small (median at most
equal to six cases) in the other nine countries. Forecasts
reported in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and Table 2, though with
some deviations from empirical data, provide quantita-
tive evidence in agreement with previous findings [3] that
air travel represents a crucial ingredient for describing
SARS propagation on a global scale. In the Additional file
1 we report the outbreak magnitude in the case of no
delay and 2 weeks delay in the reduction of the transmis-
sion rate since the detection of the first case in each coun-
try. It is possible to observe that for increasing delays the
simulations results increase their accuracy for countries
experiencing large outbreaks such as Canada and Singa-
pore. The results thus show that the delay has an impact
in determining the extent of the outbreak in certain coun-
tries. It is therefore important to stress that it is very likely
different delays have to be considered in each country
depending on the local health infrastructure.
Map representation of the comparison between numerical results and WHO reported cases Figure 4
Map representation of the comparison between numerical results and WHO reported cases. Countries are considered at 
risk if the probability of reporting an outbreak – computed on n = 103 different realizations of the stochastic noise – is larger than 20%. In 
red we represent countries for which model forecasts are in agreement with WHO official reports, distinguishing between correct pre-
dictions of outbreak (filled red) and correct predictions of no outbreak (striped red). Forecasts that deviate from observed data are rep-
resented in green. Results shown refer to the date of 11 July 2003.
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Overlap and epidemic pathways
In order to test the predictability inherent to the model in
the case of the SARS case study, Figure 6 shows the overlap
as defined in the Methods section as a function of time.
The average value is displayed together with the 95% con-
fidence interval. The overlap starts from a value equal to
1, as all stochastic realizations share the same initial con-
ditions, and decreases monotonically with time. How-
ever,  Θ(t) assumes values larger than 0.8 in the time
window investigated, confirming the relatively strong
computational reproducibility of the synthetic SARS out-
break. The simulated disease seems indeed to follow a
very similar evolution at each realization of the process.
As discussed in the previous section, the origin of such
reproducibility lies in the emergence of epidemic path-
ways, i.e. preferential channels along which the epidemic
will more likely spread [6,7]. In order to identify these
pathways, we monitor the spreading path followed by the
virus in 103 outbreaks starting from the same initial con-
ditions. More precisely, starting from Hong Kong, we fol-
low the propagation of the virus and identify for each
infected country Ci the country Cj where the infection
came from, thus defining a probability of origin of infec-
tion for each country. Results are reported in Figure 7
where the epidemic pathways are represented by arrows
whose thickness accounts for the probability of infection.
Almost every country in which at least one case was
detected in our simulations received the infection most
Number of cases by country: comparison with WHO official reports Figure 5
Number of cases by country: comparison with WHO official reports. Quantitative comparison of forecasted number of cases 
(conditional of the occurrence of an outbreak) with observed data. Simulated results are represented with a box plot in which lowest and 
highest values represent the 90% CI and the box is delimited by lower and upper quartile and reports the value of the median. Red sym-
bols represent WHO official reports and are accompanied by the value of the number of cases for sake of clarity. (A) Agreement of 
model predictions with observed data: symbols are compatible with the model predictions. Broken scale and inset are used for sake of 
visualization. (B,C) Disagreement of model predictions with observed data: WHO data lie outside the 90% CI obtained from n = 103 
numerical simulations. Results are reported in two different plots characterized by two different scales for a better visualization.BMC Medicine 2007, 5:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34
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likely directly from Hong Kong, with probabilities ranging
from 32% for Italy, to 99% for Taiwan. Spain is the only
exception as it belongs to a second level of infection from
the seed and is predicted to receive the infection from
other European countries (see the bottom left panel of
Figure 7). While this is not a completely surprising results
in the case of an airport hub such Hong Kong, it is worth
noting that results in Figure 7 do not represent the distri-
bution of infecting paths going out of a given country but
rather the probability associated to infecting paths enter-
ing in a given country. In the case of a different starting
infected city, epidemic pathways can be highly nontrivial
and therefore informative in the deployment of monitor-
ing and control resources.
Discussion
While the results shown in Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 indicate that
computational models can attain a predictive power, the
present case study for the SARS epidemic is still subject to
approximations and assumptions and very accurate pre-
dictions need the introduction of much more detail into
the computational scheme. Taiwan is the prominent
example in which the quantitative magnitude of the out-
break is not well predicted. Indeed, the model still lacks
many features that are likely responsible for the deviations
of simulation results from the official reports. Population
heterogeneity in terms of travel frequency, obviously
related to wealth distribution, is not considered. Specific
features relative to single countries (such as health care
systems, specific control strategies, travel screening etc.)
are not taken into account by our stochastic model. We
also do not consider variations in the virus transmissibil-
ity among infected individuals in each compartment. Sim-
ilarly, we account only in an effective way for the
occurrence of superspreading events and outbreak diver-
sity in the initial stage of SARS transmission [33,34,36].
By contrast, the model readily allows the integration of
the heterogeneity shown by SARS in the way it affected
different countries and which represented a very peculiar
feature of the virus. Finally, the inclusion of other trans-
portation systems is likely to have an impact in contigu-
ous geographical regions.
Overlap profile Figure 6
Overlap profile. The value of the overlap is shown as a function of time, from the initial day of the simulations (21 February 
2003) to 11 July 2003. Details on relevant events occurring during SARS epidemics are shown for reference.
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It is worth also noting, however, that the countries for
which forecasts underestimate the empirical data showed
some peculiarities in the evolution of the SARS spread.
Taiwan for instance experienced an anomalous outbreak
explosion after a temporary failure in the infection con-
tainment procedures in a single hospital [37]. Moreover,
it ought to be considered that the situation in mainland
China is not trivially reproducible, due to the lack of avail-
able information on the actual initial conditions of the
spread. Results for China are therefore not reported in the
charts of Figure 5, as numerical simulations seeded in
Hong Kong are likely not able to describe the outbreak
occurred in that country. This fact is expected to have an
impact especially in South-East Asian countries – such as
Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam – that have airline con-
nections with large traffic towards China.
Conclusion
The computational approach presented here is the largest
scale epidemic model at the worldwide level. Its good
agreement with historical data of the SARS epidemic sug-
gests that the transportation and census data used here are
the basic ingredients for the forecast and analysis of
emerging disease spreading at the global level. A more
detailed version of the model including the interplay of
different transportation systems, information about the
specific conditions experienced by each country and a
refined compartmentalization to include variations in the
susceptibility and heterogeneity in the infectiousness
would clearly represent a further improvement in the a
posteriori analysis of epidemic outbreaks. In the case of a
new emergent global epidemic the computational
approach could be useful in drawing possible scenarios
for the epidemic evolution. Though the initial conditions
and the disease parameters will be unknown before the
Map representation of epidemic pathways Figure 7
Map representation of epidemic pathways. Arrows show the paths followed by the virus in the transmission of the infection from 
Hong Kong to the other countries. The thickness of the arrows represents the probability associated to a given path, where all paths with 
probability less than 10% have been filtered out for sake of simplicity. Two different colors are used: black for paths that transmit the 
virus directly from the seed – Hong Kong – to the first level of infected countries; gray for paths that start from the first level of infected 
countries.
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disease has already spread to a few countries, the compu-
tational approach would however allow in a short time
the exploration of a wide range of values for the basic
parameters and initial conditions, providing extensive
data on the worst and best case scenarios as well as likeli-
hood intervals, to the benefit of decision makers. In gen-
eral, the encouraging results achieved with the present
level of details introduced in the modeling schemes sug-
gests that large scale computational approaches can be a
useful predictive tool to assess risk management and pre-
paredness plans for future emerging diseases and in
understanding space-time variations of outbreak occur-
rences.
Competing interests
The author(s) declare that they have no competing inter-
ests.
Authors' contributions
All authors conceived the study, collected data and per-
formed experiments for the study, analyzed results and
contributed to writing the paper. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Additional material
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the International Air Transport Association for making 
the commercial airline database available. AB and AV are partially funded by 
the European Commission-contract 001907 (DELIS). AV is partially funded 
by the NSF award IIS-0513650.
References
1. McLean AR, May RM, Pattison J, Weiss RA: SARS. A Case Study in
Emerging Infections Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 2005. 
2. Dye C, Gay N: Modeling the SARS epidemic.  Science 2003,
300:1884-1885.
3. Hufnagel L, Brockmann D, Geisel T: Forecast and control of epi-
demics in a globalized world.  P r o c  N a t l  A c a d  S c i  U S A  2004,
101:15124-15129.
4. Baroyan OV, Genchikov LA, Rvachev LA, Shashkov VA: An attempt
at large-scale influenza epidemic modeling by means of a
computer.  Bull Internat Epidemiol Assoc 1969, 18:22-31.
5. Rvachev LA, Longini IM: A mathematical model for the global
spread of influenza.  Math Biosci 1985, 75:3-22.
6. Colizza V, Barrat A, Barthélemy M, Vespignani A: The role of the
airline transportation network in the prediction and predict-
ability of global epidemics.  Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2006,
103:2015-2020.
7. Colizza V, Barrat A, Barthélemy M, Vespignani A: The modeling of
global epidemics: stochastic dynamics and predictability.  Bull
Math Biol 2006, 68:1893-1921.
8. International Air Transport Association   [http://www.iata.org]
9. Riley S, Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Ghani AC, Abu-Raddad LJ, Hedley AJ,
Leung GM, Ho L-M, Lam T-H, Thach TQ, Chau P, Chan K-P, Lo S-V,
Leung P-Y, Tsang T, Ho W, Lee K-H, Lau EMC, Ferguson NM, Ander-
son RM: Transmission dynamics of the etiological agent of
SARS in Hong Kong: impact of public health interventions.
Science 2003, 300:1961-1966.
10. Lipsitch M, Cohen T, Cooper B, Robins JM, Ma S, James L,
Gopalakrishna G, Chew SK, Tan CC, Samore MH, Fisman D, Murray
M: Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome.  Science 2003, 300:1966-1970.
11. Donnelly CA, Ghani AC, Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Fraser C, Riley S,
Abu-Raddad LJ, Ho L-M, Thach T-Q, Chau P, Chan K-P, Lam T-H,
Tsang T, Liu S-H, Kong JHB, Lau EMC, Ferguson NM, Anderson RM:
Epidemiological determinants of spread of causal agent of
severe acute respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong.  Lancet
2003, 361:1761-1766.
12. Colizza V, Barrat A, Barthélemy M, Valleron A-J, Vespignani A: Mod-
eling the worldwide spread of pandemic influenza: baseline
case and containment scenario.  PLoS Med 2007, 4(1):e13.
13. Colizza V, Barrat A, Barthélemy M, Vespignani A: Epidemic predict-
ability in meta-population models with heterogeneous cou-
plings: the impact of disease parameter values.  Int J Bif Chaos
2007, 17:2491-2500.
14. Bauch CT, Lloyd-Smith JO, Coffee MP, Galvani AP: Dynamically
modeling SARS and other newly emerging respiratory ill-
nesses – past, present, future.  Epidemiol 2005, 16:791-801.
15. Lloyd-Smith JO, Galvani AP, Getz WM: Curtailing transmission of
severe acute respiratory syndrome within a community and
its hospital.  Proc R Soc Lond B 2003, 270:1979-1989.
16. Chowell G, Fenimore PW, Castillo-Garsow MA, Castillo-Chavez C:
SARS outbreaks in Ontario, Hong Kong and Singapore: the
role of diagnosis and isolation as a control mechanism.  J Theor
Biol 2003, 224:1-8.
17. Chowell G, Castillo-Chavez C, Fenimore PW, Kribs-Zaleta CM, Arri-
ola L, Hyman JM: Model parameters and outbreak control for
SARS.  Emerg Infect Dis 2004, 10(7):1258-1263.
18. Ng TW, Turinici G, Danchin A: A double epidemic model for the
SARS propagation.  BMC Infect Dis 2003, 3:19-35.
19. Choi BC, Pak AW: A simple approximate mathematical model
to predict the number of severe acute respiratory syndrome
cases and deaths.  J Epidemiol Community Health 2003, 57:831-835.
20. Wang W, Ruan S: Simulating the SARS outbreak in Beijing
with limited data.  J Theor Biol 2004, 227:369-379.
21. Zhou G, Yan G: Severe acute respiratory syndrome in Asia.
Emerg Infect Dis 2003, 9:1608-1610.
22. Meyers LA, Pourbohloul B, Newman MEJ, Skowronski DM, Brunham
RC: Network theory and SARS: predicting outbreak diver-
sity.  J Theor Biol 2005, 232:71-81.
23. Wallinga J, Teunis P: Different epidemic curves for severe acute
respiratory syndrome reveal similar impacts of control
measures.  Am J Epidemiol 2004, 160:509-516.
24. Gume AB, Ruan S, Troy D, Watmough J, Brauer F, van den Driessche
P, Gabrielson D, Bowman C, Alexander ME, Ardal S, Wu J, Sahai BM:
Modeling strategies for controlling SARS outbreak.  Proc R Soc
Lond B 2004, 271:2223-2232.
25. Hsieh YH, Chen CW, Hsu SB: SARS outbreak, Taiwan, 2003.
Emerg Infect Dis 2004, 10(2):201-206.
26. Nishiura H, Patanarapelert K, Sriprom M, Sarakorn W, Sriyab S, Ming
Tang I: Modeling potential response to severe acute respira-
tory syndrome in Japan: the role of initial attack size, precau-
tion, and quarantine.  J Epidemiol Community Health 2004,
58:186-191.
27. Cauchemez S, Boelle PY, Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM, Thomas G,
Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Anderson RM, Valleron A-J: Real-time esti-
mates in early detection of SARS.  Emerg Infect Dis 2006,
12(1):110-113.
28. Ruan S, Wang W, Levin S: The effect of global travel on the
spread of SARS.  Math Biosci Engin 2006, 3:205-218.
29. Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Ho LM, Chau P, Wong IOL, Thach TQ, Ghani
AC, Donnelly CA, Fraser C, Riley S, Ferguson NM, Anderson RM,
Tsang T, Leung P-Y, Wong V, Chan JCK, Tsui E, Lo SV, Lam TH: The
epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome in the
Additional file 1
Additional figures and materials. The Additional file 1 contains a detailed 
description of the infection dynamics considered in the model, together 
with the results of the sensitivity analysis performed on the values of the 
risk threshold and of the intervention delay. The comparison with the 
results presented in the manuscript is presented and discussed.
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1741-
7015-5-34-S1.pdf]Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Medicine 2007, 5:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34
Page 13 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
2003 Hong Kong epidemic: an analysis of all 1755 patients.
Ann Intern Med 2004, 141(9):662-673.
30. World Health Organization. Severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS): status of the outbreak and lessons for the
immediate future. May 20, 2003   [http://www.who.int/csr/media/
sars_wha.pdf]
31. Lee N, Hui D, Wu A, Chan P, Cameron P, Joynt GM, Ahuja A, Yung
MY, Leung CB, To KF, Lui SF, Szeto CC, Chung S, Sung JJY: A major
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in Hong
Kong.  N Engl J Med 2003, 348:1986-1994.
32. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People's
Republic of China – Government Information Centre. Out-
break of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) at
Amoy Gardens, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. Main findings of
the investigation   [http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf]
33. Galvani AP, May RM: Epidemiology – dimensions of super-
spreading.  Nature 2005, 438:293-295.
34. Lloyd-Smith JO, Schreiber SJ, Kopp PE, Getz WM: Superspreading
and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence.
Nature 2005, 438:355-359.
35. World Health Organization. Cumulative number of
reported cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
[http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/en/index.html]
36. Meyers LA, Pourbholoul B, Newman MEJ, Skowronski DM, Brunham
RC: Network theory and SARS: predicting outbreak diver-
sity.  J Theor Biol 2005, 232:71-81.
37. World Health Organization. SARS: breaking the chains of
transmission. July 5, 2003   [http://www.who.int/features/2003/07/
en/]
38. World Health Organization SARS information   [ h t t p : / /
www.who.int/csr/sars/en/]
39. Booth CM, Matukas LM, Tomlinson GA, Rachlis AR, Rose DB, Dwosh
HA, Walmsley SL, Mazzulli T, Avendano M, Derkach P, Ephtimios IE,
Kitai I, Mederski BD, Shadowitz SB, Gold WL, Hawryluck LA, Rea E,
Chenkin JS, Cescon DW, Poutanen SM, Detsky AS: Clinical fea-
tures and short-term outcomes of 144 patients with SARS in
the greater Toronto area.  JAMA 2003, 289:2801-2809.
40. Taiwan Headlines. Health Chief says 94 percent of SARS
cases result from hospital infections. 20 May 2003   [http://
www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20030520/20030520s1.html]
41. Poutanen SM, Low DE, Henry B, Finkelstein S, Rose D, Green L, Tell-
ier R, Draker R, Adachi D, Ayers M, Chan AK, Skowronski DM, Salit
I, Simor AE, Slutsky AS, Doyle PW, Krajden M, Petric M, Brunham RC,
McGeer AJ: Identification of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome in Canada.  N Engl J Med 2003, 348:1995-2005.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/34/prepub